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Abstract—Mobile device consumerisation has introduced the
Bring-Your-Own-Device (BYOD) trend to the organisational
context, allowing employees to work using their personal de-
vices. However, as personal mobile devices are perceived as
less secure than those provided by the organisation, BYOD
has risen security concerns about corporate information being
accessed by mobile devices from inside and outside the corporate
perimeter. Moreover, this uncontrolled mobile device activity
makes it difficult to differentiate external (outsider) malicious
activity from reckless/naive employee (insider) behaviour, pre-
venting effective correlation of unauthorised actions with the
perpetrators. In this paper, a STRIDE-based BYOD Threat Model
is proposed to analyse BYOD Threat Interactions from inside
and outside the corporate perimeter. Our research contributes
to a better understanding and awareness about the influence of
BYOD Threats on disclosure and contamination of corporate
information, encouraging future work in the field of BYOD
security and digital forensics in order to protect information
and manage an increasing number of evidence sources.
Index Terms—BYOD, threat model, STRIDE, disclosure, con-
tamination, insider, outsider, attack, forensics.
I. INTRODUCTION
Bring-Your-Own-Device (BYOD), or Dual-Use Devices
[1] is a growing trend inside organisations [2] due to the
ever increasing mobile device consumerisation phenomenon
[3][4]. Actually, BYOD is now a common practice which
has increased employee access to new mobile technology
[5], and has improved their productivity and satisfaction [1].
As a consequence, organisations allow and even encourage
employees to use their preferred personal mobile device [3][6]
for accessing corporate information assets [7][8][9].
On the contrary, as corporate technology adoption is
currently being driven by employees [5][10], organisations
have very little (or no) control over mobile device activity
[4][11][12] as well as the security conditions that employees
are accessing corporate information with [13]. A case in point
is the traditional corporate scenario, where employees were
provided with desktops and laptops [14], giving organisations
complete security control over these devices, and expecting
security threats to be mainly perpetrated by cybercriminals
(outsiders). However, as BYOD takes over, organisations
struggle to determine whether threats to corporate information
are posed by cybercriminals (outsiders), or by a trusted em-
ployee (insider) who may compromise corporate information,
either maliciously or mistakenly [15].
Then, adopting BYOD not only gives benefits
[1][7][13][16], but also introduces potential security threats
due to uncontrolled mobile device access to information
assets [8] which, if not handled correctly [5][14], may lead
to corporate information disclosure [17] or contamination
[16]. Also, challenges for security professionals and digital
forensic investigators [18] are posed, as BYOD brings on
a vast number of evidence sources (information, operating
systems and formats) [19], hindering any future effort to
correlate unauthorised actions with the perpetrators.
Hence, this article begins discussing BYOD Threats in order
to define general External and Internal BYOD Threat Contexts
(Sections II and III, respectively) in which BYOD practices
may compromise corporate information, leading to digital
forensic investigations [20]. Next, potential threats to corporate
information are determined by applying the STRIDE Threat
Modelling approach to a common corporate BYOD scenario
(Section IV). Here, the identified External and Internal BYOD
Threat Contexts are considered to define Trust Boundaries so
that BYOD Threat Interactions from inside and outside the
corporate perimeter can be analysed.
Subsequently, by analysing these interactions (Section V),
possible attack vectors, leading to information disclosure and
contamination can be defined. For this analysis, relevant
research literature and security reports have been considered
so that the proposed Threat Model can be used for a better
understanding of real world BYOD cases in which corporate
information may be either disclosed or contaminated, requiring
further digital forensic investigations.
Finally, in Section VI, an explanation of related and future
work in the field of BYOD security and digital forensics is
given, followed by conclusions of our current research (Section
VII).
II. EXTERNAL THREAT CONTEXT: STILL THE BYOD
CRIMINAL PLAYGROUND
Cybercriminals (outsiders) are currently targeting unpre-
pared organisations to access information assets by using
emerging technologies and communication channels [21].
Since the inception of BYOD in the enterprise and employee’s
access to more sophisticated and convenient technology [3],
it is easier than ever for an outsider to steal information or
obtain financial gain [22]. Actually, because of the lack of
security awareness, outsiders have an advantage point to access
corporate information by turning employees’ normal leisure
activities into attack vectors [11], making it difficult to inves-
tigate illegal actions. Thus, downloading mobile applications
or sharing content on social networks may be backdoors for
disclosing or contaminating sensitive corporate information
through a range of different external threats, the contexts of
which are explained as follows.
A. Malware
Since 2011, the number of mobile malware families have
increased 58 per cent [11] and malware samples increased
more than 10 times between July 2012 and January 2014 [22].
This suggest that malware is still the most dangerous and per-
sistent threat to corporate information. In the BYOD context,
existent security vulnerabilities in employees’ mobile devices
[13] are exploited by malware to steal confidential information
[11], sabotage networks or deviate financial transactions [23].
Moreover, since the BYOD inception, IT departments have
lost control on mobile devices, which means that accidental
malware infections may be undetected [14], and therefore very
difficult to investigate.
B. Phishing
Attackers are becoming more creative, not only with mal-
ware, but also phishing scam which is getting more space in
the cyber threat stage [10]. For instance, a well-constructed
phishing email (spear phishing) or fraudulent SMSs [22] may
even evade traditional network security devices (firewall, IDSs
and antivirus) [23] in order to steal personal information, or
obtain financial gain. Also, since this threat spreads with ease
in unacknowledged employee collaboration environments, so-
cial networks and cloud services become the perfect ”bait” to
catch naive users [15]. Thus, very little readiness to timely
investigate and respond to security incidents is revealed since
majority of organisations with poor security awareness fully
entrust BYOD protection strategies to the employee’s security
common sense [11].
C. Social Engineering
The lack of security awareness and broad adoption of
mobile devices [10][12], makes social engineering another
persistent threat in the BYOD context. As people are still
the weakest security link inside organisations [15], attackers
send spam on emails and social networks to spread mal-
ware [11][12][15], taking advantage of human emotions [10].
Hence, naive users who check emails and use social networks
during leisure breaks, increase infection opportunities to the
corporate network [14] because the activities performed in
their personal mobile devices are harder to monitor and control
[12], making it difficult to acquire first-hand evidence.
D. Malicious Mobile Applications
Regardless of the device ownership (company or employee
owned), employees install non-corporate and unauthorised
applications either to aid their daily work activities [3][11], or
for personal leisure and socialisation [9]. As a consequence,
these applications may introduce serious threats to corporate
information as some of them may be used by attackers to
collect and disclose sensitive information, once installed on
the device [10]. Additionally, ”rooted” mobile devices (Section
III-B) may give more privilege to malicious applications to
disseminate spam and send anonymous device information [2]
to an unknown outsider whose actions are not under corporate
supervision, and may not be investigated properly.
E. Insecure Wireless Networks
The BYOD trend has also been encouraged by the em-
ployee’s accessibility to more advanced technology outside
the office [3]. This includes faster home and public wireless
networks with unknown security configuration [16], which are
far from the forensics and security organisational scope, but
closer to sensitive information assets that employees access
through them [4]. As a result, interception attacks can be easily
launched through insecure communication channels [9][13]
where they can go undetected, as long as the attacker and
the victim are in the same wireless signal range [4].
F. Fake Certificate Authorities
Digital Certificates are still a trusted means for authenticat-
ing computers over the Internet, as long as they have been
issued by a trusted Certificate Authority (CA) [24]. Actually,
mobile devices not only come with preloaded CA credentials
from factory, but also enable users to either add their own,
or remove existing ones [2], if convenient. Considering this,
corporate information can be compromised if a naive employee
has been persuaded to add a fake CA to a mobile device, or if a
trusted corporate digital certificate has been impersonated [9].
In either case, employees may be deceived to access ”bogus”
digital-signed services where attackers may steal credentials or
sensitive corporate information without leaving any evidence
of their actions.
G. Denial of Service
Denial of Service (DoS) is sometimes an overlooked threat
because recent advances in high-availability computing pre-
vent service disruption by using redundancy and backup
strategies [1]. Although these attacks are currently being used
as a diversion to launch more sophisticated and complex
ones [21][23], the emerging BYOD paradigm facilitates them
because of the uncontrolled number of mobile devices that
join corporate networks. In fact, the more connected devices
the more resource consumption [12] and without proper net-
work infrastructure planning [14], attacks against important
evidence sources, such as databases and log repositories may
be undetected.
III. INTERNAL THREAT CONTEXT: MALICIOUS OR NAIVE
EMPLOYEE ACTIONS?
Currently, BYOD adoption has promoted a mobile device
acceptance wave [3][5][10] fully driven and promoted by the
employee’s device appropriation and initiative [5]. As a result,
organisations are left with almost no control over these devices
[14][16], and much less over the actions performed through
them which are important to know in order to investigate
security breaches. For instance, a naive employee, ignoring
company security policies becomes an internal threat [13], if
installing an unauthorised application in his mobile device
introduces malware that was not specifically targeting the
organisation, but may create the perfect opportunity for an
undetected and unknown outsider to access corporate informa-
tion assets [22][25]. Meanwhile, databases may be tampered
with by a reckless highly-trusted employee who is trying to
deceive the organisation[26] by misusing his access credentials
[27]. Hence, although these illegal actions may be investigated
if proper auditing is enabled, in the BYOD context, it is
more difficult to audit and control trusted insiders’ actions
[12] because digital investigations might be challenged by the
following internal threat contexts.
A. Uncontrolled Inception of Heterogeneous Devices
Heterogeneous mobile devices that connect to corporate
networks significantly increase threats to sensitive informa-
tion [9]. Depending on the internal support level that IT
departments give to the increasing and uncontrolled range of
mobile devices available [5], these may not be compatible [3]
with the organization security measures, configurations [2] or
applications [4]. Consequently, mobile hardware and operating
system fragmentation [22], may prevent that minimum security
requirements can be met [7] to protect corporate information
that these devices access to, making it very difficult to define
digital forensics and incident response practices that encom-
pass BYOD emerging technologies [28].
B. Mobile Device Misconfiguration
Misconfiguration in mobile devices can happen by giving
elevated privileges either to mobile applications, or to the
device user himself (root privilege). The former occurs when
a user is required to give access authority to privileged infor-
mation, applications [29] and configurations [10]. The latter
happens when users choose to unlock (aka root or jailbreak)
their mobile devices [3] for using the operating system with
administrator permission [2], or when IT departments are
required to ”jailbreak” mobile devices in order to control
and monitor them [3]. Hence, mobile device misconfiguration
poses an evident dilemma regarding giving elevated privileges
to applications and ”rooted devices” because security issues
may be faced even if rooting devices is required for monitoring
and control. Also, since malicious applications may obtain
potential access to collect sensitive corporate information [10],
or perform network-related attacks [2], certain misconfigured
device functionality, such as automatic data streaming, backup
and content sharing [8] may pose serious threats to corporate
information as well as disseminating evidence in different
repositories which may be out of the organisation’s control.
C. Information Sharing on Personal Cloud Services
Employees use mobile devices in different contexts [3] not
only for personal reasons, but also for continuing working
outside the workplace [13]. Thus, personal cloud services, in
particular cloud storage [12], are used to increase employee
productivity [7] as well as availability and flexibility [12] for
accessing corporate and personal information on the same de-
vice [10]. However, as mobile devices and cloud storage sites
are exposed to hacking activities and malware infection [16],
sharing information on cloud services may expose sensitive
information to unauthorised disclosure [3][12], or corruption
[23]. Also, employees can share and modify information on
their devices[16], affecting information security and intellec-
tual property compliance [12][22], making it more difficult to
ensure information integrity and confidentiality, and requiring
organisations to get more control over evidence traces that may
be left on cloud repositories [19].
D. Mixture of Personal and Corporate Information
Employees prefer using their own mobile device [2] in order
to keep contact with family and friends [6] whilst working.
In addition, organisations allow employees to use their de-
vices to connect and access corporate networks, databases,
and servers [7] to facilitate their work and increase their
productivity. Nonetheless, accessing and storing both personal
and corporate information in the same device [7] is a threat
that may compromise corporate information integrity due to
the complexity to differentiate and separate personal from
corporate information [13], along with the uncertainty of
corporate resource usage on the employees’ mobile devices
[3], which may prevent effective monitoring of unauthorised
actions for further investigation.
E. Lost, Stolen and Unlinked Mobile Devices
Employees may have enabled the ”remember password”
feature on web browsers and applications, or may have chosen
to remain logged into their on-line accounts [11]. Then, if
lost or stolen, the device will put in hands of an outsider,
login credentials [16] to be used to access multiple services
[11][17]. On the contrary, some employees keep corporate
information on their mobile devices [16], even after they have
been ”unlinked” from the corporate network in case of ter-
mination of employment [3]. This last scenario is particularly
dangerous because it can expose corporate information and
services [4] to intellectual property violations, or disruption
of critical business obligations [12] if a vengeful employee
wants to attack corporate information assets as retaliation for
having lost his job. If the mobile device is not controlled,
even after termination of employment, the risk of identity
forgery increases [10], reducing the possibility of finding the
real culprit in case of security incidents.
F. Information Ownership
In the past, organisations provided laptops and mobile
phones for professional purposes only [14]. Currently, em-
ployees’ preference to work with their own device [2] has
shifted the balance of device control from the organisation
to the employee [4], opening a gap related to information
ownership. For example, if employees own their devices,
Fig. 1. BYOD Threat Model representing insider activity from inside and outside the CPTB
the company may not have much control over them [7],
including over the information that is generated and stored
in them. Conversely, if technologies already being used in the
organisation are used by the employee on the device [4], the
information generated by them and stored in the mobile device
belongs to the company [2][6], granting property rights over
it. However, in case the organisation, by exercising its lawful
right to protect its information, decides to remotely wipe the
mobile device if stolen, lost, or if the employee leaves the
organisation [6], all the information, including the employee’s
may be lost forever. Also, if the company wants to investigate
an employee-owned device, legal procedures must be placed
to avoid raising privacy and ownership violations [18].
IV. MODELLING BYOD THREATS TO CORPORATE
INFORMATION
After having identified the BYOD Internal and External
Threat Contexts, it is evident that corporate information is an
important asset that must be protected [3] as in the BYOD
paradigm corporate information (and digital evidence) may
reside in a variety of electronic media repositories, from file
systems and databases (owned by the company) to laptops,
tablets and phablets (owned by the employee). Thus, infor-
mation security concerns increase when dealing with BYOD
[16] because personal and corporate data becomes more dis-
perse, mixed and uncontrolled. Moreover, uncontrolled BYOD
activity may expose corporate information to outsider and
insider threats, leading to potential data disclosure [4][16]
and contamination. [2][16][23]. Hence, our research analyses
the BYOD Threat Interactions, applying the STRIDE Threat
Modelling approach [30] to a common BYOD scenario (Figure
1). This STRIDE-based BYOD Threat Model represents the
interactions in between a trusted employee (insider) and
corporate information assets, from inside and outside the
corporate perimeter, providing a better understanding of the
BYOD Threat Environment that organisations need to consider
in order to define their security and forensics readiness policies
[28] to prevent disclosure or contamination of corporate infor-
mation. This BYOD Threat Model considers the previously
analysed BYOD External and Internal Threat Contexts to
define the following Trust Boundaries:
A. Internet Trust Boundary (ITB): It is placed outside
the Corporate Perimeter Trust Boundary (CPTB) to represent
lower-trust insider activity. This trust boundary represents a
scenario in which External BYOD Threats can compromise
corporate information assets due to uncontrolled insider ac-
tivity through mobile clients. Whilst these clients interact with
Internet-located personal cloud storage services and mobile
application stores, they may be simultaneously accessing
corporate-owned web applications/servers, as shown in Figure
1-A. Here, it is assumed that connections, downloads, and
sharing activities are performed using secure communication
channels in between the mobile clients and the services.
B. Business Core Trust Boundaries (BCTB): These are
represented inside the CPTB to depict higher-trust insider
activity from within the corporate perimeter. In Figure 1-B, a
CPTB-located insider interacts with a relational database and
an audit repository using a DBMS/SQL Command Line Client,
which represents not only sensitive information repositories,
but also important evidence sources for audit and forensic
purposes.
C. Corporate Perimeter Trust Boundary (CPTB): In this
BYOD Threat Model, Internal/External Insider Interactions
are delimited inside and outside the CPTB. As shown in
Figure 1-C, these interactions are represented by a CPTB-
located insider who uses an ITB-located Mobile Client, not
only for interacting with corporate Web/Mobile Applications,
but also for accessing Mobile App Stores and Cloud Storage
Services for external mobile application downloading and file
sharing activities, respectively.
A. Threat Modelling Results
After modelling the proposed BYOD scenario using
STRIDE (Figure 1), 76 threats were identified; the most
relevant threats are shown in Table I.
TABLE I
IDENTIFIED BYOD THREATS APPLYING STRIDE
ID Threat Attack Vector Insider Outsider
I01 Data FlowInterception
Attacker sniffs
data flow to
capture info.
x x
I02
DB Creden-
tial Intercep-
tion
S01; S02; I01;
T03; DB creden-
tial stolen
x x
I04
Disclose
info. in
Cloud
Storage
Share info in
cloud storage. x
I05
Mobile
Device
Lost/Stolen
Info/Credentials
stored in the
mobile device
x
D01
Excessive
Resource
Consump-
tion
Unhandled
resource
consumption in
DB or Web/Mob.
App.
x
D02
Data Flow
Interruption
in Web
Server/DB
D01; E01; An
attacker forces
data flow to
stop/change.
x x
D03 DB Unavail-able
D02; Data recep-
tion is interrupted x x
D04
Log Reposi-
tory Unavail-
able
D02; Logs not
enough/unavailable x x
Each threat ID begins with the initial of the six threat cate-
gories considered by this threat modelling approach [30]: (S)
Spoofing, (T) Tampering, (R) Repudiation, (I) Information Dis-
closure, (D) Denial of Service and (E) Elevation of Privilege.
The likelihood of being performed by Insiders and Outsiders
has also been considered to provide a better understanding of
insider/outsider threat interaction in the BYOD context.
V. CHALLENGES OF BYOD THREATS TO SECURITY AND
FORENSICS
The results in Table I are not enough to understand the
interactions and influence that each one of them may have over
corporate information. Therefore, based on the most relevant
identified threats in Table I, further analysis was performed to
determine the interactions amongst them, considering relevant
research literature and security reports so that the proposed
BYOD Threat Model can be used to understand real threat
scenarios that may challenge security and forensics strategies
to prevent disclosure or contamination of corporate informa-
tion.
A. BYOD Threats leading to Information Contamination or
Corruption
In BYOD, keeping information integrity is more challenging
[3] due to threats related to employee habits towards access
and usage of corporate information assets [2], which can
expose information to data contamination [23]. For instance,
Table I - Continued
ID Threat Attack Vector Insider Outsider
E01 Buffer Over-flow
E03; change data
flow/app. execu-
tion
x
E02 Social Engi-neering
Deceive user to
disclose info. x
E03 Malware/Botnet
Remote Code
Exec. through
Mobile Client
x
E05
DBMS/SQL
Command
Line Misuse
Unauth./Misused
DB Access x
S01 DB Forgery Change destina-tion of SQL DB x x
S02
Web
Server/Mobile
App.Forgery
Change
destination of
web serv/mobapp
x
S03 Cloud Stor-age Forgery
Change
destination
of Cloud Storage
x
S04
Unauth. Ac-
cess to SQL
DB
DBMS/SQL
Comm. Line
Spoofed
x x
T01 SQLInjection
Bad select
statem. from
web/mobileapp.
to DB
x x
T02 DB Corrup-tion
R03; T01; T03;
Data flow modi-
fied before reach-
ing DB.
x x
T03
XSS in
Web/Mob.
App.
User input is not
sanitised. x x
R01 Data no Re-ceived
D03; Repudiate
activity in DB. x
R02
Untraceable
Cloud
Activity
Repudiate activ-
ity in cloud stor-
age.
x
R03
Insufficient
Web Server /
DB Auditing
R01; R02; Not
enough audit logs x x
as shown in Figure 2, Tampering threats may be used by
insiders and outsiders as attack vectors to corrupt corporate
databases through SQL injection or Cross Site Scripting (XSS)
attacks. Similarly, an outsider or a malicious insider may use
DoS attacks to interrupt the data flow to the database, or
to the audit log repository, bringing on Repudiation issues
due to insufficient or inexistent audit trail generation which
challenges forensic investigations.
Actually, insider and outsider malicious activity against
Fig. 2. Interactions amongst BYOD Threats that may lead to information contamination
corporate data was already reported back in 1975 [31], where
computer systems vulnerabilities were known as means for
gaining operative system control in order to, firstly, disable
accounting and auditing programs (log and audit repositories),
and then read or modify programs and data without being
detected. This scenario has not changed much in recent years
as these actions are still being carried out by malicious
database administrators (DBAs), urging database vendors and
security professionals to issue security bulletins to mitigate
malicious insider risks [32] along with advice on insider
activity detection and prevention [33], which is vital for
forensic readiness purposes [28].
Conversely, malware was always related to malicious out-
sider activity to contaminate data, and has been associated
with DoS attacks and data flow interruption, which urged
U.S. Courts to incorporate changes to their Computer Crime
Laws, early during the ’90s [34]. Nonetheless, it has been
reported [35] that malware is used by insiders as ”retaliation”
for employment termination in order to damage information,
or infecting corporate networks using USB devices as when
the Stuxnet worm infected Iran’s uranium facilities [36].
Thus, before BYOD, organisations had control over the
information assets used by employees to access corporate
information, making it easier to detect and investigate ma-
licious insider activity. Now, it would be almost impossible to
determine if certain attacks are linked to malicious outsiders,
or in the worst scenario, to naive or reckless insider behaviour
[37], such as accidental malware infections [14], or risky
file sharing in Cloud Storage Services [23], respectively. As
shown in Figure 2, the proposed BYOD Threat Model may
be considered accurate and simple enough to depict not only
BYOD threats to corporate information integrity, but also
their interactions, providing better understanding of possible
attack vectors that can be used to investigate information
contamination by either malicious employees (insiders), or
cybercriminals (outsiders).
B. BYOD Threats leading to Information Disclosure or Leak-
age
As previously discussed, in BYOD contexts, mixture of
personal and corporate information (section III-D), exposes the
latter to attacks [2] that may lead to unauthorised disclosure,
compromising information confidentiality. Since organisations
are usually prepared to defend the corporate perimeter [12]
against outsider attacks in the Internet Trust Boundary (ITB)
(Figure 1-A), they overlook security measures in the Business
Core Trust Boundary (BCTB) (Figure 1-B), allowing insiders
to become dangerous threats to information assets, and pre-
venting effective investigations to find the perpetrators. This is
an evident effect of the lack of insider activity control, either
being illegitimate (privilege misuse, financial gain) or naive
(victims of social engineering or malware) [38].
On the other hand, although some companies are reluctant
to give employees more freedom over corporate information
[5], employees keep using cloud services to share information
(section III-C), which may lead to security implications and
regulatory compliance issues [9]. However, file sharing in
Cloud Storage Services is not the only problem to consider.
In fact, data leakage can also happen when mobile devices
are lost [11][12][23], stolen[4][2], or unlinked from the or-
ganisation in case of termination of employment [3][4]. This
scenario has been depicted in the proposed BYOD Threat
Model (Figure 3) as lost, stolen or unlinked mobile devices are
usually ignored evidence sources and information repositories
that can be lost forever when an employee leaves the organ-
isation [39]. Additionally, disclosing information nowadays
is not just about stealing data in transit, but also data at
rest (stored in databases) that could be threatened by any
vulnerability, as reported by TrustWave in 2014 [40]. This
has been represented in Figure 3, where the proposed BYOD
Threat Model also depicts classic Spoofing and Tampering
Fig. 3. Interactions amongst BYOD Threats that may lead to information disclosure
threats as attack vectors, leading to information leakage. For
instance, by spoofing Web/Mobile Applications, Cloud Storage
Services or Databases, corporate information can be diverted
and stored in the attacker’s repository leaving no evidence
of the leakage for later investigation. Similarly, by using
Tampering attacks like XSS, database access credentials can
be captured, and subsequently re-used to get unauthorised
access to databases, actions that may give an slight chance of
generating digital evidence unless database audit and logging
mechanisms are disabled [41].
Finally, in Figure 3, Interception (Sniffing) attacks can be
used by insiders and outsiders to steal credentials and data
that is travelling through an insecure, but not necessarily, unen-
crypted channel. For example, by the end of 2015, 84 per cent
of Australian companies were still vulnerable to the OpenSSL
Heartbleed vulnerability which was being used by outsiders
to steal user names and passwords [42]. In the proposed
BYOD Threat Model, encrypted communication channels in
between clients and services have been considered (Figure 1-
A) to analyse the threats of Data Interception, even through
encrypted channels. For example, attackers can ’spoof’ Cloud
Storage locations and encrypt the communication channel
using a fake or replicated Digital Certificate to deceive the
victims, having their credentials and information written in the
”spoofed” attacker’s service, avoiding any evidence generation
in the corporate systems.
VI. RELATED WORK
Previous work to analyse BYOD Threats has been done,
but neither considering both security and digital forensics
issues. First, Mobile Device Management (MDM) solutions
[2][4][16] have been proposed to help organisations securing
mobile device access to the corporate network [16] rather
than preventing and monitoring information access and misuse
(i.e. disclosure and contamination). On the contrary, although
STRIDE-based Threat Models have already been applied for
supporting digital forensic readiness initiatives [43], BYOD
Threat Interactions have not been considered to identify secu-
rity and forensics requirements that need to be fulfilled. Hence,
our research not only provides a baseline for understand-
ing the environment in which such proactive initiatives may
be deployed [28], but also encourages future work towards
protecting corporate information from unauthorised disclosure
and contamination, considering different evidence sources in
the BYOD context.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Internal and External BYOD Threat Interactions to corpo-
rate information have been analysed, using a STRIDE-based
Threat Model (Fig. 1) so that security and forensic challenges
of BYOD threats to corporate information can be understood.
Thus, it has been found that adopting BYOD introduces
potential threats which may lead to corporate information
contamination (Fig. 2) and disclosure (Fig. 3).
Regarding information contamination (Section V-A), the
analysis showed that uncontrolled mobile device access to
information assets [8] brings challenges for security pro-
fessionals and digital forensic investigators [18] due to the
ever increasing number of heterogeneous evidence sources
(Section III-A) that may hinder any future effort to investigate
security incidents in the BYOD environment. Also, even
though insiders are not seen as potential threats, their naive or
malicious actions become attack vectors that can compromise
not only information integrity (see section III-D), but also
introducing repudiation issues when disabling logging and
auditing repositories (Figure 2).
With regard to information disclosure (Section V-B), in-
formation confidentiality issues are introduced, either unin-
tentionally when outsiders deceive naive insiders to disclose
sensitive information, or intentionally when malicious insiders
misuse their high-privilege credentials to access sensitive
information (Figure 3). In either case, unless insider actions are
properly monitored and controlled, unintentional or malicious
mobile activity to disclose information cannot be timely de-
termined, affecting chain of custody provenance requirements
during forensic investigations.
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